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Abstract: Capital flows to developing countries are small and are mostly take the form 
of loans rather than direct foreign investment. We build a simple model of North-
South capital flows that highlights the interplay between diminishing returns, 
production risk and sovereign risk. This model generates a set of country portfolios 
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acknowledges financial help from the Fundación Ramón Areces.Capital flows to developing countries are positive, small, and mostly take the 
form of lending instead of foreign investment.  The bold line in Figure 1 shows the 
combined net foreign asset position of 47 non-OECD countries as a share of their 
combined wealth from 1970 to 1997.  Throughout this period these countries have 
been net recipients of capital.  Their net capital imports average about 10 percent of 
their wealth, fluctuating moderately  between 8 and 12 percent.  Figure 1 also shows 
that loans are the preferred asset to finance capital flows to poor countries.  Over the 
period 1970-1997, on average about three-quarters of the net foreign liabilities of 
poor countries consisted of net lending, with the remainder consisting primarily of 
foreign investment.  The share of net lending has declined over time, but is still well 
over 50 percent toward the end of our sample period.  Foreign investment by poor 
countries in rich countries is negligible.  Appendix 1 describes the data and provides 
a number of robustness checks regarding these basic facts.
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It seems safe to argue that a theory of North-South capital flows requires at 
least two ingredients to be able to explain these empirical observations. The first one 
would be one or more incentives for capital to flow from rich to poor countries. Natural 
candidates for this role are diminishing returns at the country level and/or country-
specific production risk. If either of these two forces are present, the risk-adjusted rate 
of return to capital declines as more capital is invested in a country, creating an 
incentive to invest in countries that have little capital. In the absence of a 
countervailing force, this incentive would only be eliminated if capital stocks per 
person were equalized across countries. Since the set of developing countries 
considered in Figure 1 has about four fifths of the world population and owns about 
one fifth of the world’s wealth, equalization of capital stocks per person would require 
a net foreign asset position of –300 percent of their wealth!  The theory clearly needs 
a second ingredient to explain why capital flows are so small. 
 
                                                  
1 Throughout the paper we use the data of Kraay, Loayza, Servén and Ventura [2000]. See 
Sinn [1990], Rider [1994] and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2001] for alternative sources of data. 
 
 1A popular view is that the theory just needs to recognize that rich countries 
have better technologies and human capital, and this is why investors keep most of 
their capital in rich countries even in the presence of diminishing returns and 
production risk. As stated however, this explanation only begs the question since it is 
not clear why technologies and human capital do not flow to poor countries together 
with physical capital. But even if one is willing to take this for granted, it cannot be the 
whole story.  While better technology and human capital in rich countries can explain 
why net foreign asset positions are small, it cannot explain how they are financed. To 
the extent that countries have some desire to diversify production risk, the theory 
leads to the prediction that countries should hold large gross foreign investment 
positions that are roughly balanced, and they should have no incentive to lend. But 
Figure 1 has already shown that most capital flows take the form of loans, and that 
gross foreign investment positions are small.  
 
In this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that sovereign risk might 
be the second ingredient that the theory needs.
2  Figure 2 shows that over the past 
200 years there have been four episodes of widespread systemic default by poor 
countries.  These episodes lasted around 20 years, and were interspersed by 30-40 
year periods during which defaults were relatively rare.  The notion that foreign 
investments and loans are subject to sovereign risk is therefore hardly novel or 
controversial.  The interesting question is whether the presence of this type of risk 
can account for the main empirical features of capital flows to developing countries. 
To determine this, we construct a simple North-South model of international capital 
flows. The production technology exhibits diminishing returns at the country level and 
country-specific risk. In this model, the world economy experiences periods with 
substantial North-South capital flows, which culminate in the South defaulting on its 
foreign obligations. This initiates a crisis period in which international financial 
                                                  
2 Obstfeld and Rogoff [1996, p.349] define sovereign risk as referring to “... any situation in 
which a government defaults on loan contracts with foreigners, seizes foreign assets located 
within its borders, or prevents domestic residents from fully meeting obligations to foreign 
creditors.” This is a good description of what we have in mind.  Rogoff, Reinhart, and 
Savastano (2003) document the history of default on sovereign debt in a large sample of 
countries over the past 200 years. 
 2markets shut down. Eventually, North-South capital flows resume and the cycle starts 
again. As a result of these recurrent crises, domestic capital offers a country not only 
the value of its production flow, but also a hedge against the risk of foreign default. 
This creates a home bias in the demand for capital that might explain why capital 
flows to developing countries are small. 
 
Whether sovereign risk can also explain how capital flows to developing 
countries are financed depends crucially on how we model the consequences of 
default. Assume first that if a country defaults on its foreign obligations, foreign 
countries respond by seizing the assets that this country owns abroad and then using 
these assets to (partially) compensate the loss. Assume also that the process by 
which assets are seized and transferred to creditors is not costly. Or, if this transfer is 
costly, assume this cost is always avoided through efficient renegotiation of claims 
after the default.
3 Under either of these assumptions, default is just a transfer of the 
net foreign asset position to the defaulting country. To minimize exposure to 
sovereign risk, countries then choose small net foreign asset positions. But they do 
not have to hold small gross foreign investment positions. Once again, to the extent 
that countries have a desire to diversify production risk they would again choose large 
gross foreign investment positions that are roughly balanced, and they would have no 
incentives to lend.  
 
Assume instead that transferring ownership of foreign investments is costlier 
than transferring ownership of loans.
4  Moreover, assume also that renegotiation of 
claims is inefficient and sometimes defaulting countries seize loans and foreign 
investments despite the costs. An implication of these assumptions is that the costs of 
default rise with the share of capital flows that take the form of foreign investments. If 
the desire to avoid diminishing returns creates an incentive to transfer capital from 
                                                                                                                                          
 
3 If seizing assets is costly and renegotiation of claims is efficient, there will never be a seizure 
of assets. Instead, the country will extracts a payment from foreign countries in exchange of 
“honoring“ its financial obligations towards them.  
4 After all, the former requires transferring the control of real assets, while the latter consist 
only of canceling financial claims. 
 3rich to poor countries, foreign loans will be a more attractive asset if sovereign risk is 
high relative to production risk. Thus, sovereign risk has also the potential to explain 
why loans are the preferred asset to finance capital flows, and why gross foreign 
investment positions are small. 
 
  This paper is related to at least three lines of literature.  The growth literature 
has studied how differences in returns affect incentives for international capital flows.  
Most influentially, Lucas (1990) asked why capital does not flow from rich to poor 
countries, given likely large return differences.  A second line of literature has studied 
the incentives for international portfolio diversification and risk sharing.  This literature 
has wondered why foreign investments are so small given substantial opportunities to 
share risk internationally.  Lewis (1999) surveys the extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature in this area, which has for the most part focused on the foreign 
investment positions of industrial countries.  A third, more recent, and much smaller 
strand of the literature has asked how countries’ foreign investment positions are 
financed.  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) document that the composition of 
international capital flows has shifted toward direct and portfolio equity investment 
during the 1990s, and Albuquerque (2003) develops a model in which foreign direct 
investment is the preferred asset to finance international capital flows since it is more 
difficult to expropriate. 
  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents a benchmark model of 
North-South capital flows and shows that differences in technology and human capital 
alone cannot explain the main features of the data.  Even with plausible differences in 
technology, we find that too much capital flows from North to South, and that these 
flows take the form of foreign investments rather than loans.  Section 2 introduces 
sovereign risk, assuming that renegotiation is efficient.  We find that adding an 
empirically plausible amount of sovereign risk to the model brings its predictions for 
net foreign asset positions much closer to the data.  However, the model still cannot 
explain how these positions are financed.  Section 3 adds inefficient renegotiation, 
and shows that this inefficiency can account for why North-South capital flows are 
 4financed primarily by loans. Section 4 concludes.  Appendix 1 describes the data, and 
Appendix 2 provides solution details. 
 
 
1. Complete markets and the technology gap 
 
We start by describing a benchmark world in which countries can commit to 
honouring all of their contractual obligations. Although this assumption shall be 
relaxed later, the assumptions on preferences and technology remain constant 
throughout the paper. We consider a world with two countries, North and South; one 
factor of production, capital; and a single good that can be used for consumption and 
investment. This good is the numeraire. North and South contain a continuum of 
identical consumer/investors that evaluate consumption sequences as follows: 
 
(1)  δ>0)  ∫
∞
⋅ δ − ⋅ ⋅
0
t dt e ) t ( c ln E (
 
where c is per capita consumption of the North. The time index will be omitted 
whenever this is not confusing. Throughout, we use an asterisk to denote South 
variables. We assume North has higher initial wealth than South, i.e. a(0)>a*(0). 
 
Production requires capital. Let k and k* be the capital stocks located in North 
and South. We assume that a fraction η of the world population lives in North, and 
normalize the world population to one. To produce one unit of capital, one unit of the 
consumption good is required. Since capital is reversible, the price of each unit is 
always one and its return is the flow of production net of depreciation. Let ω and ω* 
be two standard Wiener processes with independent increments with E[dω]= 
E[dω*]=0, E[dω
2]=E[dω*
2]=dt  and  E[dω⋅dω*]=0. The flow of production net of 
depreciation is given by R⋅dt+V⋅dω in North and R*⋅dt+V*⋅dω* in South; where R and 
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5 The parameter π (≥1) measures the technological 
advantage of North, i.e. higher mean productivity.  The parameter γ (0≤γ≤1), 
measures the strength of diminishing returns which, for simplicity, are treated here as 
an externality or congestion effect.
6 The parameter σ (≥0) measures the importance 
of country-specific production risk. This formulation allows countries to have different 
technologies and populations. It also captures the two forces that, in the absence of a 
technology gap, create incentives to equalize the capital stock per worker across 
countries. 
 
We assume that North (South) residents own and operate all the capital stock 
that is located in North (South). As usual, we could obtain the prices and allocations 
that apply with complete markets by assuming that North and South residents have 
access to a sophisticated financial market in which a full set of Arrow-Debreu 
securities are traded. In this environment however, the same prices and allocations 
are obtained by assuming that North and South residents have access to a financial 
market in which only risk-free bonds and claims on North and South production are 
traded.
7 Risk-free bonds have a price of one and promise an instantaneous interest 
rate r⋅dt. Claims to North (South) production have a price v (v*) and promise to pay 
the net flow of production generated by one unit of North (South) capital. We shall 
refer to the holdings of risk-free bonds and claims to overseas production as foreign 
loans and foreign investments, respectively. 
 
                                
5 One way to understand these assumptions is to imagine the North as a collection of identical 
individuals running each a different uncorrelated project. If this project has size K, it promises 
an expected return of π⋅K
-γ with a standard deviation equal to σ. Then, a portfolio of all the 
projects of the North has mean and standard deviation equal to R and V, as defined in the 
text. A similar set of assumptions for the South justifies the choice of R* and V*. 
6 At the cost of further notation, we could generate this dependence by assuming there is a 
production factor that is not priced, or an export good that faces a downward-sloping demand. 
7 See Merton [1990, ch. 14 and 16] for a comprehensive analysis of the complete-markets 
model in continuous-time. He also constructs a dynamic trading strategy that replicates the 
payoffs of any Arrow-Debreu security with a portfolio that, in the context of our model, contains 
only risk-free bonds and claims to North and South production. See also Obstfeld and Rogoff 
[1996, chapter 5] for a discussion of this issue in the model of Lucas [1982]. 
 6Given this asset choice, North’s budget constraint can be written as follows: 
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where a is the per capita wealth of the North; e and e* are foreign investments in 
North and South; and l are foreign loans held by North. Naturally, the following 
restriction applies: 
 
(3) l * e * v e v k a + ⋅ + ⋅ − = ⋅ η ; 
 
The budget constraint in Equations (2)-(3) shows how the expected return and 
volatility of wealth depend on portfolio decisions. Throughout, we rule out Ponzi 
schemes and impose short-sale constraints on foreign investments, i.e. e≥0 and e*≥0.  
 
To determine the optimal consumption and portfolio rules, the representative 
consumer in North maximizes (1) subject to (2), (3) and the dynamics of asset prices 
and their return characteristics, i.e. the laws of motion of r, v, v*, R and R*. Since the 
representative consumer is infinitesimal, he/she understands that his/her actions 
have no influence on these prices and their evolution. Appendix 2 shows that the first-
order conditions associated with this problem can be written as follows: 
 








⋅ = ρ −  












* V * v * R
2
⋅ η
⋅ ≤ ⋅ ρ − ; with strict ineq. if e*>0 
 
 7where ρ is the multiplier associated with constraint (3) divided by the marginal utility of 
wealth. This quantity can be interpreted as the risk-free rate that applies on loans 
between North residents. A similar set of first-order conditions applies to South. 
 
  The first-order conditions in Equations (4)-(8) are quite standard. Equation (4) 
is the first-order condition associated with c; and shows the familiar result that 
consumption equals the annualized value of wealth. With logarithmic preferences, the 
discount factor is equal to the rate of time preference. Equation (5) is the first-order 
condition associated with k; and says that the premium for holding domestic 
production risk, R-ρ, is the covariance between the return to one unit of domestic 







⋅ .  Equation (6) is the first-
order condition associated with l; and says that the domestic interest rate equals the 
interest rate on foreign loans. Equation (7) is the first-order condition associated with 
e; and it can be interpreted as determining the price at which North is willing to sell 
claims on its own output. Equation (8) is the first-order condition associated with e*; 
and defines the demand for foreign investment. 
 
  We are ready now to derive the implications of this model for North-South 
capital flows and their financing. Straightforward algebra shows that the quantity of 
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This result means that there is full sharing of production risk, as each country 
receives a share of world production that is proportional to its share of world wealth. 
What is the cost of foreign investments? Since the supply of capital is flat, North and 
South are willing to sell shares of production at a constant price:
9 
 
                                                  
8 This follows form Equations (3), (6)-(8) and South’s counterparts. 
 8(10)    1 * v v = =
 
The implications for country portfolios of Equations (9) and (10) are twofold: (i) foreign 
investment positions are large since each country holds the same share of its wealth 
as claims on North and South production, i.e. 
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; and (ii) there is no trade in loans in 
equilibrium.  
 
A little bit of additional algebra shows that in equilibrium the world distribution 








⋅ η − + ⋅ η
η











* a ) 1 ( a





⋅ η − + ⋅ η
η −
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Equations (11) and (12) describe the demand for North and South capital, and 
Equation (13) is the market-clearing or world adding-up constraint. Note that the 
interest rate is lower than the marginal product of capital, as investors demand a 
premium for holding production risk. The demand for North capital is higher than the 
demand for South capital as a result of the technological gap, i.e. π≥1. In the absence 
of this gap, both countries would have the same capital per person in equilibrium. 
 
Figure 3 plots South’s net foreign asset position i.e. 
* a ) 1 (
* k * a ) 1 (
*
⋅ η −
− ⋅ η −
= NFA , 
and the structure of its portfolio as a share of its wealth, as a function of π, σ, and γ.   
                                                                                                                                          
9 This follows from Equations (5), (7) and South’s counterparts. 
10 To see this, substitute Equation (9) into Equations (3), (5)-(6) and South’s counterparts. 
 9We set 
η
σ
= V  equal to the standard deviation of OECD aggregate per capita GDP 
growth during our sample period of 1970-1997, which is 0.02.  Since the OECD’s 
population share of our sample is η=0.2, this implies a benchmark value of  σ=0.01, 
and we also consider values ranging from zero to 0.02.  Since the expected value of 












                  
, the case of γ=0 corresponds to the linear growth 
model, while γ=0.5 roughly corresponds to the neoclassical growth model.  Within this 
range, we consider γ=0.25 as a reasonable intermediate benchmark, as well as a 
range from 0 to 0.5.   Finally, we allow North’s productivity advantage to vary from 




Consistent with the evidence, the theory predicts North-South capital flows to 
be positive for our benchmark parameter values, i.e. the foreign asset position of 
South is negative.  However, these flows are much larger than those observed in the 
data.  For our benchmark parameters, the net foreign asset position of South is –126 
percent of its wealth, while in the data it is only about –10 percent.  As noted above, 
these net foreign asset positions consist entirely of foreign investments, and net 
lending is zero.  North investment in South represents 181 percent of South wealth, 
while South investment in North is 55 percent of South wealth.  In contrast, in the 
data South investments in North are negligible, North investments in South are about 
2.5 percent of South wealth, and South borrowing accounts for 7.5 percent of South 
wealth. 
 
Not surprisingly, the predictions of the model for net foreign asset positions 
are quite sensitive to the key parameters describing the production technology.  The 
smaller is the North’s productivity advantage, π, the greater are North-South capital 
                              
11 To produce Figure 3 and all the figures that follow, we normalize world wealth η⋅a+(1-
η)⋅a*=1.  We also set η⋅a/(η⋅a+(1-η)⋅a*)=0.8 to reflect our estimate that the wealth of the 
OECD constitutes about 80% of world wealth. Finally, we scale the expected return to capital 
in both countries so that the world average expected return to capital is equal to 2% for all 
parameter values. 
 10flows.  In fact, as discussed in the introduction, if one assumes that π=1, the model 
predicts that South’s net foreign asset position is –300 percent of its wealth.  In 
contrast, if North has a two-fold productivity advantage, North-South flows begin to 
approach magnitudes observed in the data.  The bottom two panels of Figure 3 show 
that the greater is production risk and the stronger are diminishing returns, the greater 
are North-South capital flows.  For our baseline parameter values, capital can even 
flow from South to North if diminishing returns are weak enough.
12  In all cases, 
however, these foreign investment positions are financed entirely by equity, and 
international borrowing and lending is zero. 
 
To sum up, the complete-markets model can generate positive North-South 
capital flows for reasonable parameter values.  But the model also exhibits two 
features that do not sit well with the data: (i) the theory predicts North-South capital 
flows that are much larger than the data; and (ii) the theory predicts that these capital 
flows are financed by large foreign investment positions, while in the data they mostly 
take the form of loans. What is the source of this discrepancy between theory and 
data? Our hypothesis is that the model goes wrong when it assumes that countries 
can commit to fulfilling all of their contractual obligations. By adopting this 
assumption, the complete-markets model neglects the history of North-South capital 
flows, which is plagued by recurrent episodes of default and renegotiation of foreign 
obligations. Surely, these episodes must have an effect on the investment strategies 
of North and South residents. We shall explore this next.  
 
 
2. Sovereign risk 
 
It is evident that foreign loans and foreign investments will be used in 
equilibrium if and only if the probability they are honored is high enough. It is also 
evident that enforcing contracts sometimes requires the threat of force. These 
                                                  
12 When diminishing returns are sufficiently weak, we arrive at a corner solution where all of 
the capital stock is located in the North, given our choices for the other parameters. 
 11observations raise a familiar time-inconsistency problem. Since governments cannot 
punish foreign citizens, international financial transactions crucially rely on 
governments’ willingness to punish their own citizens if they default on their 
obligations towards foreigners. All governments would like to commit to punish default 
‘ex-ante’, since this would allow domestic investors to exploit beneficial trade 
opportunities. But this commitment might not always be credible, since governments 
might not have an incentive to punish default ‘ex-post’. It is this lack of credibility that 
creates sovereign risk, and its key implication is that beneficial trade opportunities are 
left unexploited for fear of default. 
 
We model the decision to punish default as a rational decision of the 
government. Let s={0,1} be the state of the world. During ‘normal times’ (s=0) both 
countries can credibly commit to punish their citizens in the case of default with 
penalties that are large enough to discourage default in the first place. As a result, if 
s=0 no country defaults. During ‘crisis periods’ (s=1) countries cannot credibly commit 
to imposing penalties in the case of default that go beyond retaliation in kind. As a 
result, if s=1 the country with a negative net foreign asset position defaults.
13  Let α⋅dt 
and β⋅dt be the probabilities that the world transitions from s=0 to s=1 and vice versa; 
and assume these transitions are independent of production shocks, i.e. 
E[dω⋅ds]=E[dω*⋅ds]=0. The value of ds is revealed after countries have chosen their 
portfolios. As a result, the probability of default is α⋅dt if s=0 and 1-β⋅dt if s=1.
 14  The 
world economy therefore exhibits periods of trade in assets that culminate in crises (s 
transitions from s=0 to s=1) in which the debtor country defaults. After this happens, a 
crisis period ensues in which there is no trade in assets. Eventually, international 
trade in assets resumes (s transitions from s=1 to s=0) and the cycle starts again. 
Naturally, the complete-markets model presented in the previous section applies as 
                                                  
13 Since time is continuous, returns are of order dt, and stocks are of order 1.  Therefore, 
returns have only a negligible impact on the default decision.  
14 If the probability of default is large, investors do not purchase foreign loans and foreign 
investments. But then both countries are indifferent on whether to default or not. To ensure the 
existence of equilibrium, we assume they default (on their non-existent foreign obligations) so 
that the beliefs of investors are consistent with the proposed default probabilities. 
 12the special case in which the world economy starts in normal times and the probability 
of a crisis is negligible, i.e. s=0 and α→0. 
 
  In normal times there is trade in assets and we can write North’s budget 
constraint as follows: 
 
(14)   ds
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and the restriction in Equation (3) still applies. The only novelty with respect to 
Equation (2) is the presence of a third term describing the wealth shock that the 
investor experiences at the onset of a crisis period. As a result of default, all foreign 
obligations are forfeited and the country loses/gains its net foreign asset position. 
During crisis periods there is no trade in assets and we must impose the additional 
restriction that e=e*=l=0.  
 
To determine the optimal consumption and portfolio rules, the representative 
consumer in North maximizes (1) subject to (3), (14), the restriction that e=e*=l=0 if 
s=1, and the dynamics of asset prices and their return characteristics, i.e. the laws of 
motion of r, v, v*, R and R*. Appendix 2 shows that the first-order condition 
associated with c and k are independent of the state of the world and are still 
described by Equations (4) and (5).  During crisis periods this is all that is required to 
characterize the dynamics of the world economy. In normal times, we also have the 
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 13  Since now there is some probability that foreign obligations are not fulfilled, 
international transactions require a sovereign risk premium. Equation (15) says that 
the premium for holding sovereign risk, r-α-ρ, is equal to the covariance between one 





⋅ α , times the ratio of 




15   Equation 
(16) can still be interpreted as determining the price at which North is willing to sell 
claims to its own output. Each claim sold by North reduces its income by the flow of 
production generated by one unit of capital, but now it also provides a gain of one unit 
of capital in the event of a crisis. Equation (17) defines the demand for foreign 
investment in the presence of both production and sovereign risk. 
 
What are the implications of sovereign risk for North-South capital flows? It is 
straightforward to show that Equation (9) still describes the equilibrium foreign 
investments and foreign loans as a function of the world distribution of capital stocks. 
In other words, the presence of sovereign risk does not preclude full sharing of 
production risk. This result might seem counterintuitive at first sight, but the intuition 
behind it is rather simple.  Since countries’ only exposure to sovereign risk is their net 
foreign asset position, countries hedge against this type of risk by holding small net 
foreign asset positions. This does not preclude countries from hedging against 
production risk by holding many foreign investments, provided that their value be 
roughly balanced.  
 
Does this mean that we are back to the complete-markets model? Not quite. A 
first effect of sovereign risk is that, unlike the complete-markets model, full sharing of 
production risk might now be achieved with small foreign investment positions. The 
reason is that sovereign risk creates a discount on foreign investments that makes 
                                                  
15 Default shocks are rare but large. Production shocks are instead frequent but small and, in 
the limit of continuous time, the ratio of the marginal value of wealth before and after a 
production shock is one. This is why the premium on holding production risk is simply the 
covariance. 
 14them “cheap” relative to domestic ones. To see this, note that we can now write the 













Countries are willing to sell foreign investments at a discount reflecting the probability 
of default, since in this event they will reclaim these investments. An implication of 
Equation (18) is that full sharing of production risk does not require countries to spend 
the same share of their wealth to purchase domestic and foreign production. If 
discounts are large enough, the model might be able to explain why gross foreign 
investment positions are small. 
 
A second and more important effect of sovereign risk is that it makes North-
South capital flows smaller than in the complete-markets model. To see this, note that 
the world distribution of capital stocks is now implicitly determined by Equation (13) 
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Now the world interest rate need not be below the marginal product of capital. 
Although capital still commands a premium to compensate for production risk, foreign 
loans also command a premium to compensate for sovereign risk. This creates a 
home bias in the demand for capital that raises the demand for North capital more 
than for South capital. As α→∞, we find that the world distribution of capital stocks 
approaches the world distribution of wealth, i.e. k→η⋅a and k*→(1-η)⋅a*. 
 
 15Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the quantitative implications of adding sovereign risk 
to the basic model.  In order to interpret these figures, we need a benchmark value 
for α.  To obtain this, note that normal times last on average for 1/α years before a 
crisis occurs.  Figure 2 showed that the two major default episodes of the 20
th century 
were preceded by periods of 30-40 years where default was relatively rare (1890-
1930, 1950-1980).  This suggests that α=0.03 is a reasonable benchmark value.  We 
also consider a range of values for α between 0 and 0.06 to explore the sensitivity of 
our results to the importance of sovereign risk. 
 
The top panel of Figure 4 shows that modest amounts of sovereign risk lead 
to substantial reductions in the price of foreign investments.  For our benchmark 
parameter values, we find that v=0.37 and v*=0.48, and these discounts become 
larger as the probability of default increases.
16  The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows 
that South investments in North increase, and North investments in South decrease.  
To see why, note that sovereign risk creates a home bias in the demand for capital, 
but since North is richer than South the North’s capital stock increases while the 
South’s decreases.  Full risk sharing then implies that South investments in North 
must increase, and North investments in South must decrease.     
 
The first panel of Figure 5 shows the net effect of these movements in 
quantities and prices on the net foreign asset position of South.  The value of foreign 
investment in both countries falls, and South’s net foreign asset position shrinks in 
absolute value as sovereign risk increases.  For the benchmark value of α=0.03 
South’s net foreign assets are -16 percent of wealth.  This is roughly a fifth as large 
as in the model with no sovereign risk, and is now quite close to the –10 percent of 
wealth that we observe in the data.  While the predictions of the model for net foreign 
assets begin to resemble the data, foreign investment positions continue to be 
                                                  
16 An additional question is whether we observe these substantial discounts in reality. The 
evidence is overwhelming that loans to developing countries usually command a higher 
interest rate than domestic loans in normal times. But we do not know of any evidence 
suggesting that foreign investments earn an excess return over domestic investments in 
normal times. 
 
 16financed exclusively by equity, and international lending is zero. The associated gross 
foreign investment positions, although smaller than before, remain large relative to 
the data. For our benchmark parameter values, South investment in North constitutes 
28 percent of South wealth, and North investment in South is 45 percent of South 
wealth.  While these are much smaller than the corresponding values of 55 percent 
and 181 percent in the model with no sovereign risk, they remain much larger than in 
the data where South investments in North are negligible and North investments in 
South are 2.5 percent of wealth.    
 
The remaining panels of Figure 5 shows how the addition of sovereign risk 
affects the sensitivity of the model’s predictions to changes in the parameters 
summarizing the production technology.  As before, increases in North’s 
technological advantage reduce the magnitude of North-South capital flows, while 
increases in production risk and diminishing returns result in greater North-South 
flows.  However, comparing Figures 3 and 5 it is clear that the sensitivity of the 
model’s predictions to technology parameters is substantially dampened by the 
introduction of sovereign risk.  Consider for example the extreme case where North 
has no technology advantage over South.  In the previous model this resulted in 
foreign assets equal to –300 percent of South’s wealth.  Adding a modest dose of 
sovereign risk to the model reduces this by a factor of six, to –44 percent of South 
wealth.   
 
Removing the assumption that countries always fulfill their obligations has 
moved the model closer to the data by providing a reason why these flows are so 
small. But the success is not complete. Although the model predicts smaller net 
foreign investment positions than the complete-markets model, these positions are 
still too large relative to the data.  Moreover, the model still predicts that there should 
be no trade in loans, while in reality foreign asset positions are financed primarily by 
loans.  What is wrong with the model? How do we fix it? A key assumption of the 
model is that each country owns and operates its own capital. Foreign loans and 
foreign investments are merely financial obligations, and default consists of forfeiting 
these obligations without inducing any change in the ownership and control of real 
 17assets or capital.  This might not be a very realistic assumption, especially as it 
applies to foreign investments. In the real world, foreign investments include more 
than the right to receive a share of production. Typically, they also include the right to 
control and operate the real assets that generate this production. In the event of 
default, foreign investors might be forced to relinquish this control and this might be 
costly. We next explore the implications of this. 
 
 
3. Inefficient Renegotiation 
 
  Assume that a foreign investment or claim to production gives its owner the 
right to operate and control the unit of capital that generates this production. Perhaps 
there is a moral hazard problem underlying this specific packaging of rights. But here 
we shall leave this friction unspecified and simply take the contract as a given. 
Assume also that the country must incur a cost x to take control of one unit of capital 
away from the foreign investor, if the latter does not cooperate. We shall think of this 
as a physical cost, but it could also measure the loss of any valuable advantage that 
the foreign investor brings to production and is unwilling to leave behind after being 
expropriated (experience, managerial skills, know-how, access to better technology or 
relationships, and so on). If the investor cooperates, the country does not incur any 
cost when taking control of foreign investments. 
 
An implication of this new assumption is that the country will be willing to pay 
the foreign investor up to x per unit of capital in order to secure its cooperation in the 
event of default.
17 This gives room to a renegotiation of claims. If this renegotiation is 
efficient, the foreign investor will ask the defaulting country to pay x (minus epsilon) 
per unit of capital in exchange for his/her cooperation. The country will accept and, as 
in the previous model, default does not generate a loss of capital. Unlike the previous 
                                                  
17 Another interpretation of the model is that the country is willing to accept a bribe of 1-x in 
order to “honor” its financial obligation and leave the unit of capital under the control of the 
foreign investor. After this happens, the foreign investor rushes out of the country. Otherwise, 
he/she would be forced to pay the bribe again a period later with probability 1-β⋅dt. 
 18model however, the default is only partial now since foreign investors can keep a 
fraction of their investments. With efficient renegotiation, the costs of transferring the 
control of capital act as a penalty to default and make sovereign risk less severe. As 




But renegotiation of claims under the threat of default is hardly efficient in real 
world situations. One reason might be asymmetric information. Assume the defaulting 
country knows x, but the foreign investor does not. In particular, assume x=H with 
probability p and x=L otherwise, with L<H≤1. In any renegotiation, the best strategy 
for the defaulting country is to claim that x=L and, as a result, a separating equilibrium 
is not possible.  Assume that foreign investments consist of a continuum of projects 
and that x is uncorrelated across them.  Then, if p⋅H>L, the foreign investor’s optimal 
strategy is to ask for a payment of H (minus epsilon) per unit of capital in exchange 
for his/her cooperation. With probability 1-p, this offer is not accepted and the foreign 
investor does not cooperate. With asymmetric information, renegotiation is therefore 




What is the equilibrium probability of default with inefficient renegotiation? As 
before, if s=0 no country defaults. However, if s=1 a country defaults only if its net 
foreign asset position is negative enough. That is, South (North) defaults if and only if 
v⋅e-l-v*⋅e*≤-λ⋅e* (v*⋅e*+l-v⋅e≤-λ⋅e), i.e., if the gains from repudiating debt and 
expropriating foreign investments exceed the loss of investment abroad and the loss 
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18 The solution of this model is “almost” the same as the solution to the model of section 3, 
provided that we replace α for α⋅x. It differs only in one inconsequential detail (x affects the 
marginal utility of wealth after default). In any case, the solution converges to the complete-
markets model of section 2 as x→1; and it converges to the sovereign risk model of section 3 
as x→0. 
19 Following the interpretation of the earlier footnote, this assumption is equivalent to assuming 
the country expropriates only a fraction 1-p of the foreign investments. Thus, the model is 
consistent with most foreign investments not being expropriated in a crisis. 
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, the net foreign asset positions are small 
because countries are similar and the incentives for capital flows are small.
20 If α is 
high, the net foreign asset positions are small because countries fear default.
21  We 
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 and α is positive but 
not too high. Under these assumptions, the probabilities of default are as in the 
previous section.   
 
  Assuming inefficient renegotiation affects the budget constraint of the North 
during normal times, since now taking control of foreign investments entails a cost in 
terms of capital. This is reflected in the following generalization of Equation (13): 
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Solving the problem of North’s representative consumer, we still find that Equations 









⋅ α = ρ −   












⋅ − = − ⋅ ρ  
                                                  
20 If investors believe that no country defaults when s=1, the equilibrium of the model implies 





* a ) 1 ( , no country has an incentive to default in 
such an equilibrium and this validates investors’ beliefs. 
21 In this case, there is no Nash equilibrium in which the country follows a pure strategy. But 
we can construct a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as follows: Let q be the probability of 
default that leads investors to choose country portfolios such that v⋅e-l-v*⋅e*=-λ⋅e*. South is 
indifferent between defaulting or not. There is an equilibrium in which South defaults with 
probability q/α when s shifts from zero to one. 
 











⋅ ≤ ⋅ ρ − ; with strict ineq. if e*>0. 
 
The only novelty in Equations (22)-(24) is the presence of λ, which measures 
how inefficient debt renegotiations are. Equation (22) shows that inefficient 
renegotiations increase the sovereign risk premium because North’s wealth after 
default is lower. This effect also appears in Equations (23) and (24). Inefficient 
renegotiations also imply that North gains less from defaulting on foreign investments. 
This effect is shown in Equation (23). 
 
The first implication of inefficient renegotiation is that full risk sharing is no 
longer possible. The foreign investments in North and South are now implicitly 
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In contrast with Equation (9), North and South no longer hold shares of each others’ 
production that are proportional to their shares in wealth.  Rather, the interaction of of 
inefficient renegotiation combined with sovereign risk implies that foreign investments 
are smaller than would be required to achieve full risk sharing.  The size of 
departures from full risk sharing is governed by the balance of sovereign risk relative 
to production risk,  . On the one hand, foreign investments are better than 
loans to finance capital flows because they allow countries to diversify production 
risk. The importance of this incentive to use foreign investments grows with the 
importance of this type of risk, i.e. with σ
2 /σ λ ⋅ α
2. On the other hand, foreign investments are 
                                                  
22 This follows from Equations (22)-(24) and South’s counterparts. 
 
 21less attractive to finance capital flows because in the event of default they generate 
social losses. The importance of this disincentive to use foreign investments grows 
with the importance of these losses and these depend on the frequency of default 
and the loss per default, i.e. with α⋅λ. In the previous models, we always assumed 
that λ=0.  Since there was no disincentive to use foreign investment to finance capital 
flows, full risk sharing obtained.  
 
  We now have two reasons why gross foreign investment positions might be 
smaller than the benchmark of full risk sharing: fewer foreign investments are made, 
and they still trade at a discount. To see this, we can compute the discount on forign 
investments with efficient renegotiation as follows: 
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The higher is λ, the smaller is the residual value of foreign investments to the seller in 
the event of default, and hence the smaller is the discount countries offer on foreign 
investments.  In the limiting case λ→1, foreign investments are fully destroyed during 
default, and v=v*=1.   
 
The world distribution of capital stocks is now implicitly determined by 
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These expressions generalize Equations (19) and (20) for the case where λ>0. 
 
 22Figure 6 and 7 explore the quantitative implications of inefficient renegotiation 
for the size and composition of country portfolios.  Figure 6 shows how foreign 
investments in North and South decline as λ increases. For our benchmark parameter 
values, North investments in South reach zero when λ=0.006, and South investments 
in North reach zero when λ=0.016. This is because North’s exposure to sovereign 
risk is higher, resulting in a weaker North demand for foreign assets than South 
demand for foreign assets. Figure 6 also shows that the prices of foreign investments 
increase slightly with λ. Higher values of λ mean that the value of expropriated capital 
is smaller, and hence countries offer smaller discounts on foreign investments. 
 
The first panel of Figure 7 shows that South’s net foreign asset position does 
not vary significantly with λ, and remains around –16 percent of wealth. However, 
increases in λ do have strong effects on how this position is financed.  As λ increases 
from zero to 0.006, North investments in South are replaced by North lending to 
South. When λ reaches 0.016, South investments in North also fall to zero, and 
international capital flows are financed entirely through loans. This suggests that 
inefficient renegotiation can help to bring the theory much closer to the data, by 
providing a reason why countries prefer to use loans rather than equity to finance 
their foreign asset positions.  Moreover, only a relatively small dose of inefficiency in 
the renegotiation is required for this to be true, as the composition of foreign assets 
switches entirely to loans at very small values of λ.  Where the theory is less 
successful is in its predictions for the relative magnitudes of North and South foreign 
investments. The theory predicts weakly larger South investments in North than North 
investments in South for all values of λ, while in the data we see that South 




                                                  
23 As shown in Figure 1, during the 1990s foreign investment to developing countries grew at 
the expense of net borrowing. In the context of our model, this composition change can be 
explained by improvements in the perceived ability to renegotiate successfully in the event of 
default. One hypothesis would be that this is the result of the policy and institutional reforms 
that took place in many developing countries in the 1990s. 
 23The remaining panels of Figure 7 show how the predictions of the model vary 
with the remaining parameters of interest.  We do not have a good sense of what is a 
reasonable value of λ to use as a benchmark.  We therefore take λ=0.02 in what 
follows simply because it delivers foreign investment positions that are financed only 
by loans.  As before, increases in α reduce South’s net foreign assets as well as 
gross foreign investment positions.  In addition, higher values of α lead a shift in the 
composition of North-South flows away from foreign investments and towards loans.  
As before a larger North productivity advantage and/or weaker diminishing returns 
reduce North-South capital flows.  However, for most of the range of the parameters 
we consider, these flows are now financed primarily through loans. Finally, increases 
in production risk again lead to slightly larger North-South flows, and when production 
risk is sufficiently large there are foreign investments in North and South despite the 
inefficiency of renegotiation in the case of default. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The data shows that capital flows to developing countries are small and 
mostly take the form of loans rather than foreign investment. The standard complete-
markets model of international finance, based on diminishing returns at the country 
level and country-specific production risk, predicts large capital flows to developing 
countries that mostly take the form of foreign investments instead of loans. This 
discrepancy between the model and the data remains even after we take into account 
that developed countries have more human capital and better technologies than 
developing ones. 
 
Our contribution consists of showing that two reasonable modifications to the 
standard model go a long way towards reconciling the theory with the data. The first 
one is to recognize that the world economy experiences recurrent episodes of 
systemic default, and that this creates an impediment to capital flows. In fact, we find 
that an empirically reasonable dose of sovereign risk reduces predicted flows to 
 24levels that start to resemble those we see in the data. The second modification is to 
recognize that, during default episodes, renegotiations are likely to be more inefficient 
for foreign investments than for loans, and this introduces a bias against the former 
and towards the latter. Although it is admittedly difficult to calibrate this effect, we 
have found that a relatively modest amount of inefficiency is consistent with loans 
being the preferred vehicle to finance capital flows to developing countries.  
  
Despite these positive results, there is still much to do on both the theoretical 
and empirical fronts. For the sake of parsimony, we have considered a world in which 
developed and developing countries differ only in their initial wealth and productivity 
levels. Surely there are other differences between countries that are likely to be 
relevant for the issues at hand, such as economic structure and institutions. Also, we 
have chosen to work with a very streamlined model of default and renegotiation in 
which repayment is based only on the commitment to apply penalties, and the 
inefficiencies in renegotiation are caused only by asymmetric information. It seems 
however reasonable to think that repayment is in part based on the desire to maintain 
a good reputation and that coordination failures among creditors and debtors also 
constitute an important source of inefficiency in renegotiations. Finally, we want to 
emphasize that our assessment of how well the model approximates the data is 
based on a simple calibration exercise and this can never be a substitute for serious 
econometric work. For these and other reasons, the results presented here should be 
seen as only a step towards a better understanding of capital flows to developing 
countries.
 25Appendix 1 – Data on North-South Capital Flows 
 
Our data on North-South capital flows is taken from the working paper version 
of this paper, Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000), and is described in detail 
there.  In that paper, we have constructed estimates of the stocks of domestic and 
foreign assets for a sample of 68 countries from 1966 to 1997.  In particular, we have 
constructed estimates of the domestic capital stock, stocks of foreign direct 
investment and portfolio equity investments assets and liabilities, as well as 
international borrowing and lending.
24  Domestic capital stocks are constructed by 
cumulating domestic investment flows.  Foreign assets and liabilities are primarily 
constructed by cumulating corresponding flow data from the IMF Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook, accounting for changes in the value of the underlying 
assets, and drawing on a variety of sources and assumptions to generate initial 
stocks for these series.  We define the wealth of a country as the sum of its domestic 
capital stock and its net foreign assets.
25   
 
The first panel of Table A1 shows the net foreign assets and their components 
for an aggregate of non-OECD countries which we refer to in the text as the “South”.
26   
Table A2 reports the country-year observations underlying this aggregate.  The data 
on net foreign assets and net lending are identical to those underlying Figure 1 in the 
text.  We have however disaggregated the data on foreign investments shown in 
                                                  
24 We do not include accumulated net errors and omissions in our measures of foreign assets.  
We do so because (i) it is not clear whether errors and omissions reflect errors in the current 
account or the financial account of the balance of payments, and (ii) we do not know which 
gross balance of payments items are affected by the measurement error summarized in net 
errors and omissions.   
25 As is well known, global balance of payments data do not balance and the sum of the 
current accounts of all countries in the world has been significantly negative over the past 20 
years (see for example IMF (1992)). These global discrepancies in flow data are also reflected 
in our stock data on foreign assets.  Unless we attribute the bulk of this discrepancy to net 
South-North flows, our stylized facts on North-South flows continue to hold. 
26 Note that we do not have information on bilateral foreign asset positions.  Throughout we 
maintain the fairly reasonable assumption that South-South investments are negligible. This 
allows us to estimate South’s gross foreign assets and liabilities vis-à-vis the North by simply 
summing the gross foreign assets and liabilities of every country in the South.  To the extent 
that South-South flows are important, our method may overstate the size of the South’s gross 
positions. 
 26Figure 1 into foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investments.  We do this to 
recognize the possibility that the problems of inefficient renegotiation discussed in the 
text may not apply to the minority ownership stakes captured in the portfolio equity 
investment data.  This in turn raises the issue of whether we should measure the 
foreign investments in the theory as foreign direct investment alone, or as the sum of 
foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investments.  In the data, however, 
portfolio equity investments are a very small part of total foreign investments, and so 
this distinction matters little empirically.  The portfolio equity liabilities of the South 
average 0.2 percent of South wealth, as compared with direct investment liabilities 
averaging 2.9 percent of wealth.  Although portfolio equity investments in the South 
have increased significantly in the 1990s, they remain small at 0.5 percent of South 
wealth.   
 
The second panel of Table A1 presents the same information as before, but 
instead defining the South as countries with per capita GDP in 1985 less than $5000 
US at market exchange rates.  Although this alters somewhat which countries we 
identify as “North” and “South”, it does not change our basic observation that capital 
flows are small and are financed primarily through loans.  In this alternative sample, 
the net foreign assets and net lending of South average -9.8 and –7.3 percent of 
South wealth, as opposed to -10.3 and -7.5 percent in the baseline. 
 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) also present estimates of stocks of foreign 
assets for a large sample of countries over the period 1970-1998.  Their data is also 
based on the accumulation of flow balance of payments data, but the authors make a 
number of different assumptions, primarily regarding the valuation of these stocks.  
The bottom panel of Table A1 verifies that our stylized facts also hold in this 
alternative dataset.  This alternative dataset shows smaller gross and net positions 
than in our data, in part reflecting some differences in country coverage between the 
two datasets.  South’s net foreign assets average –5.7 percent of wealth, with net 
lending averaging –3.6 percent of wealth.  On average, this dataset shows that net 
lending is 63 percent of South’s net foreign assets, while in our dataset net lending is 
75 percent of net foreign assets.  We conclude from this that our main stylized facts of 




Both datasets also show that the share of net lending in the net foreign assets 
of the South has declined during the 1980s and 1990s.  In our dataset the share of 
net lending falls from 78 percent during the 1980s, to 67 percent during 1990-97.  In 
the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti dataset, the corresponding figures are 73 percent and 51 
percent, respectively.  This decline in the relative importance of net lending appears 
to have continued in recent years.  The World Bank’s 2003 Global Development 
Finance publication reports that the ratio of external debt to stocks of inward FDI fell 
from around 300 percent to 200 percent between 1997 and 2001 (World Bank 2003).  
Understanding the factors driving this trend is an interesting issue that we postpone 
to future research. 
 
As a further robustness check, we consider the possibility that the low share of 
equity in the South’s portfolio is due to the legal restrictions on foreign direct 
investment that were prevalent in many South countries during our sample period.  
We do not have a long time series of restrictions on equity investments required to 
systematically investigate this hypothesis.  We do however have some limited and 
suggestive evidence, relying on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions which has begun to distinguish between restrictions on 
different types of capital inflows after 1996.  Based on the unpublished data 
underlying this source, Tamirisa (1999) has constructed a series of detailed indices of 
capital controls for the period 1996-2001.  We focus on the year 1996, which gives us 
the most observations in our database on country portfolios.   
 
We measure restrictions on FDI as the simple average of their two indices of 
restrictions on FDI flows and restrictions on the liquidation of FDI positions.
28  The 
                                                  
27 The only other notable difference between the two datasets is that South’s portfolio equity 
liabilities are relatively larger and increase faster in the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti dataset.  This 
is likely due to the fact that they use stock market valuations for portfolio equity which 
increased sharply in the 1990s, while in our data we use domestic investment deflators to 
measure changes in the value of domestic capital. 
 28indices range from zero (no restrictions) to one (restrictions are present in all the 
underlying categories measured by the IMF).  This index does show that restrictions 
on FDI are more prevalent in poor countries than rich countries:  the mean value of 
the index in the North is 0.15, while in the South it is 0.46.  Interestingly, however, this 
measure of controls does not seem to be significantly correlated with share of FDI in 
total liabilities:  a regression of the share of FDI on this measure of controls yields a 
slope coefficient of –0.03 with a t-statistic of 0.63 using all countries in our sample in 
1996.  For the South countries alone, the slope is –0.10 with a t-statistic of –1.45.   Of 
course this evidence is only suggestive, and we cannot reject the possibility that the 
lack of a significant correlation between restrictions and the share of FDI is due to 
measurement error in the restrictions variable.  Nevertheless, this finding seems 
consistent with the larger literature on the effects of capital controls, which typically 
has found mixed evidence on the impacts of capital controls on the volume and 
composition of capital flows (see for example Eichengreen (2001) for a survey).  
Taken together this suggests to us that the presence of overt restrictions on equity 
investment is not the only reason why capital flows to poor countries mostly take the 
form of loans. 
                                                                                                                                          
28 The index of restrictions on FDI flows aggregates restrictions on inflows and restrictions on 
outflows.  However, this distinction may not be so important.  For a smaller sample of 
countries in 1996, Tamirisa (1999) constructs separate subindices of controls on inflows and 
on outflows.  Removing controls on outflows from our overall index of controls results in a 






Appendix Table A1:  Foreign Asset Position of South: 




















Baseline:  Data from Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000), South = Non-OECD
1970-79 -11.2% 0.3% 0.0% 3.4% 0.2% -8.0%
1980-89 -10.6% 0.2% 0.0% 2.4% 0.1% -8.3%
1990-97 -8.8% 0.4% 0.1% 3.0% 0.5% -5.8%
1970-97 -10.3% 0.3% 0.1% 2.9% 0.2% -7.5%
Variant 1:  Data from Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000), South = GDP/Capita<$5000
1970-79 -9.6% 0.2% 0.0% 2.8% 0.2% -6.9%
1980-89 -10.7% 0.2% 0.0% 2.1% 0.1% -8.7%
1990-97 -8.8% 0.4% 0.1% 2.8% 0.6% -5.9%
1970-97 -9.8% 0.3% 0.0% 2.5% 0.3% -7.3%
Variant 2:  Data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), South = Non-OECD
1970-79 -6.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% -3.8%
1980-89 -5.6% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% -4.1%
1990-97 -5.4% 0.4% 0.2% 2.7% 0.6% -2.7%
1970-97 -5.7% 0.2% 0.1% 2.1% 0.2% -3.6%
 
Note:  This table reports the time series averages of the foreign assets and liabilities of the South as a fraction 





Appendix Table A2:  Countries Included in South   
 
Country First Year Last Year Country First Year Last Year
Algeria 1966 1991 Korea, Rep. 1969 1997
Argentina 1966 1997 Lao PDR 1989 1991
Bangladesh 1972 1997 Lesotho 1980 1994
Bolivia 1966 1997 Malaysia 1976 1994
Brazil 1966 1997 Mauritius 1974 1997
Cameroon 1979 1995 Mexico 1966 1997
Chile 1966 1985 Morocco 1966 1997
China 1981 1997 Nicaragua 1966 1994
Colombia 1967 1994 Oman 1973 1989
Congo, Rep. 1973 1997 Pakistan 1966 1997
Costa Rica 1966 1995 Peru 1975 1993
Cote d'Ivoire 1970 1995 Philippines 1967 1997
Dominican Republic 1969 1994 Saudi Arabia 1966 1989
Ecuador 1966 1996 Senegal 1968 1996
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1966 1996 Singapore 1966 1997
El Salvador 1966 1997 South Africa 1968 1997
Guatemala 1966 1994 Sri Lanka 1966 1997
Honduras 1966 1997 Syrian Arab Republic 1967 1988
India 1966 1997 Thailand 1969 1997
Indonesia 1966 1994 Trinidad and Tobago 1974 1994
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1966 1982 Tunisia 1966 1997
Israel 1969 1997 Uruguay 1967 1997
Jamaica 1968 1995 Venezuela, RB 1974 1997
Jordan 1966 1991
 Appendix 2 -- Proofs 
 
In this appendix, we solve the representative consumer’s problem and show 
that Equations (4), (5), and (22)-(24) describe the optimal consumption and portfolio 
rules. The investment opportunity set that the consumer faces is fully described by 
the vector X=(v,v*,r,R,R*,σ,σ*). We shall denote the i
th element of this vector as xi. Let 
the dynamics of this element be given as follows:
29 
 
(A1)    ds * d d dt dx i
*
i i i i ⋅ ξ + ω ⋅ ψ + ω ⋅ ψ + ⋅ µ =
 
 In  equilibrium,  µi, ψi, ψi*, and ξi might be functions of aggregate variables, but 
the representative consumer is infinitesimal and does not take into consideration how 
individual choices affect these aggregates. Let F
0 and F
1 be the value functions of the 
representative consumer when s=0 and s=1, respectively. Then during crisis periods 

























































































Note that the last term captures the effect of the change in state from crisis to normal 
times.  Since the change in state does not affect wealth, both F
0 and F
1 are evaluated 
at the same level of wealth, a.  The first-order condition associated with this Bellman 
equation is: 
 
                                                  













During normal times (s=0) we have that: 
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Note that the effect of a the transition from normal times to crisis periods is captured 
by the last term in the Bellman Equation, and that this transition is accompanied by a 
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 is the multiplier of the constraint η⋅a=k-v⋅e+v*⋅e*+l; and κ1, κ2 and κ3 
are the multipliers associated with the constraints that k≥e, e≥0 and e*≥0, 
respectively. The usual Kuhn-Tucker complementary-slack conditions apply: κ1⋅(k-
e)=0, κ2⋅e=0 and κ3⋅e*=0. It is straightforward to verify that  ) X ( f a ln
1
F
0 0 + ⋅
δ
=  and 
) X ( f a ln
1
F
1 1 + ⋅
δ
=  solve the Bellman equations (A2) and (A4). Using these value 
functions and the first-order conditions, it follows that (A5)-(A9) correspond to 
Equations (4), (5) and (22)-(24) in the text.  Equations (6)-(8) follow immediately by 
setting α=λ=0 in Equations (22)-(24), and Equations (15)-(17) follow from setting λ=0 
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Figure 3:  Foreign Asset Position of South in Complete Markets Model 
(Fraction of South Wealth)   
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Figure 4:  Sovereign Risk and Country Portfolios   
 



































Figure 5:  Sovereign Risk and Country Portfolios   
(Fraction of South Wealth) 
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Figure 6:  Inefficient Renegotiation and Country Portfolios   
 







































Figure 7:  Inefficient Renegotiation and Country Portfolios 
(Fraction of South Wealth)   
 
 









0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
λ










0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
α
ev -e*v* -l nfa*
 
   43
 
 
Figure 7, cont’d:  Inefficient Renegotiation and Country Portfolios 
(Fraction of South Wealth)   
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